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URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9629Death is the ﬁnal event in the life of a person, but what structures its timing
is not just the characteristics of the individual. Until the last few decades,
studies of socioeconomic diﬀerentials in mortality depended on data col-
lected for populations located in geographic units. Thus when nineteenth-
century English investigators commented on the high mortality of the poor,
they had to rely on correlations among registration districts in the incidence
of the poor and the death rate. A skeptic might charge that this conclusion
rested on an ecological fallacy because the evidence did not reveal who ac-
tually died within each district.
Although based on necessity and dependent on published data, this
approach is conceptually not entirely fallacious. Family reconstitution
studies of early modern village populations suggest that socioeconomic
diﬀerences in mortality of people living in an area tended to be small or
nonexistent, whereas diﬀerences between areas, particularly cities and ru-
ral areas, tended to be very large (Smith 1982). The risk of death faced by
individuals in the past was one that they partially shared with their neigh-
bors. In a mortality regime dominated by infectious diseases, dangers lurk-
ing in the food, water, and air threatened people living in proximity. On the
other hand, such inﬂuences shared by neighbors are certainly not the entire
story. Over and over again, for example, demographers have shown that
death rates vary systematically with age.
Data sets constructed recently, such as the one detailing the experiences
of Union Army enlisted men serving in the Civil War and after (Fogel 2000),
represent a major advance beyond studies constrained by published tabu-
lations. First, multiple and overlapping factors associated with the inci-
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of death can be examined over time.
Paradoxically, the pioneering analyst of disease mortality of individual
soldiers that is recorded in this unique data set found that factors beyond
the individual were important. Variations between urban and rural areas
and between rural farmers and nonfarmers, indexes interpreted as tapping
the incidence of prior exposure to disease, were major determinants of the
risk of acquiring and dying from disease in the army. Childhood nutrition
and health, inferred from height, did not matter. Economic resources, in-
dexed by property wealth recorded in the federal census of 1860, may have
had an inﬂuence only for diseases related to nutrition among residents of
metropolitan counties (Lee 1997, and ch. 3 in this volume). It was not just
the economists who might or should be surprised by these results. Histori-
cal demographers are conﬁdent that death rates for adults steadily increase
with age, even among young men who served in the army. Yet this routinely
observed pattern appears only for nonfarmers and for men enlisting in met-
ropolitan counties (Lee’s ch. 3 in this volume).
These results contain three paradoxes. First, the healthier, the wealthier,
and large groups of the younger were not unambiguously more likely to live
than the less healthy, poorer, and older. Second, the analysis of a unique in-
dividual-level data set uncovered the importance of a factor—prior expo-
sure to disease—whose source was collective. Third, the orientation of the
discipline of epidemiology (or sociology) seems to be more relevant for un-
derstanding these results than those of other disciplines.
4.1 Exposure to Risk at Place of Origin: Urbanization and Mortality
Given the importance of the deﬁnition, scope, and functioning of disease
environments, more needs to be known about them. Building on Lee’s
work, this paper combines both individual- and aggregate-level data and at-
tempts to specify several of the correlates of disease mortality at a ﬁner level
of detail. An investigation of the incidence and timing of disease mortality
among Union Army enlisted men in companies from New York state is
placed in the context of a parallel study of mortality of regiments and other
units of army volunteers that were organized in the Empire State.
New York is the focus primarily because of a uniquely detailed published
tabulation of outcomes of military service by regiments and other units. Its
author was Frederick Phisterer (1912, vol. 1, 288–303), a pioneering statis-
tician of the Northern military eﬀort during the Civil War (1907).1For oﬃc-
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1. Born in Germany in 1836, Phisterer served in the regular army, entering as a private in the
artillery in 1855 and leaving as a sergeant in 1861. Reenlisting in the U.S. Army in July 1861, he
was discharged as captain in 1870. From 1877 onward he was active in the National Guard, ris-
ing to the rank of Brevet Major-General and the position of Adjutant-General of the New York
National Guard. Living in Albany, between 1890 and 1908, he published three editions of a ﬁve-
volume survey totaling 4,499 pages on the New York men and units who fought in the Civil War.ers and enlisted men, he reported the numbers who were killed in action,
who died of or recovered from wounds received in action, who died of dis-
ease, and who died of six other known causes (and one unknown cause) that
were less frequent. He also tabulated these data separately for those who be-
came prisoners of war and those who were never captured. Contemporaries
and historians of the Civil War have highlighted the horrendous conditions
and high death rates in prisoner-of-war camps. Since the fraction of a regi-
ment that fell into enemy hands varied considerably depending on circum-
stances (the median percentage was 5.35 while the mean was 7.96 and the
standard deviation 11.38), this adjustment is useful.
Among the 267 New York volunteer organizations, there were 183 regi-
ments of infantry, 33 of cavalry, and 3 of engineers, and 48 regiments, bat-
talions, or batteries of artillery. Unlike most of the compilers of other state
reports, Phisterer provides an approximation of the population at risk.
However, the column headed by the phrase “the number of men in organi-
zation among whom losses occurred” misleads. The heading in the recapit-
ulation replaces “men” with “enlistments,” indicating that those who reen-
listed were counted more than once. In any case, the available proxy for
the population at risk does not take account of other causes of attrition—
transfer, desertion, discharge, etc.2 Finally, Phisterer provides a detailed
summary of the history of the unit, including the dates it was mustered in
and out and places where it served. The former allows the calculation of
death indexes by duration, and the latter information can be mapped onto
regional disease environments.
In the nineteenth century, urbanization dramatically increased mortality
(Haines 2001). Although less well documented, it also was related to health
and morbidity. Contemporaries certainly believed as much. A medical ex-
aminer of draftees and recruits for a New York City district noted, among
other comments, that “congestive diseases, as apoplexy, delirium tremens,
&c, dependent on causes too palpably incident to a large, crowded, im-
moral, and ill-cleaned city to need speciﬁcation, are numerously met with”
(Roberts 1865, 264). Another city medical examiner, Dr. W. H. Thompson,
reported on the unhealthy conditions in his district, especially for the Irish.
He was also “struck with number of persons among the better classes, and
native Americans, with weak constitution, deﬁcient girth of chest, and slen-
der physique, especially among the younger men. The contrast, in this re-
spect, with what I had noted in American country-recruits in 1862 is so
marked that I have been led to consider city-life in New York as exerting an
unfavorable inﬂuence on physical development, especially in children”
(Thompson 1865, 252).
There were towns and cities in the state outside of New York City. Fur-
ther, factors other than urbanization, such as residence along transporta-
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2. Since the population at risk cannot be precisely captured, these measures are referred to
as death indexes rather than rates.tion routes such as the Erie Canal, could be associated with exposure to dis-
ease (Haines, Craig, and Weiss forthcoming, table 3). Data from New York
state allow a subtler isolation of ecological variables that theoretically are
associated with the extent of prior exposure to disease than is possible by
merely characterizing counties as urban or rural. Two sources were used to
index the disease environment among counties within the state of New
York. Three censuses—the 1850 federal and the 1845 and 1855 state re-
turns—yielded a relative index, however underestimated, of the crude death
rate in each county. Township-level data from the 1845 census were also
used to calculate the proportion in each county who resided in places with
populations of 2,500 and larger and of 5,000 and larger.
Although men in regiments and especially companies were recruited lo-
cally, they did not all come from the same county. A rather elaborate proce-
dure was used to index the disease environment of recruits in the various mil-
itary units. Based on reports from families, the 1865 state census tabulated,
for each regiment or other unit, the number of living New York–resident
soldiers who were from each county (New York Secretary of State 1867,
637–48). The four counties with the largest share of troops in the 278 units
included, on average, 74 percent of the men. In the 192 infantry regiments,
the ﬁgure was 77 percent. The estimated death and urbanization index for
each regiment was the average, weighted by the share of each county and
the residual in the totals of living soldiers reported for each unit, of crude
death rates and urbanization rates in these four counties and the residual.
The data from the New York state census of 1845 indicate (see table 4.1)
that the urbanization eﬀect on mortality is continuous rather than dichoto-
mous. Crude death rates increased from a rate of 11.4 per 1,000 in town-
ships under 1,000 in population to a rate of 15.7 per 1,000 for places be-
tween 7,500 and 60,000 in population. The rate for New York City was even
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Table 4.1 Township Population Size and Census Crude Death Rate, New York 1845
Town Population
Population of Township Crude Death Rate Total Percent Number of Townships
Under 1,000 11.4 60,792 2.3 94
1,000–1,499 12.5 159,255 6.1 124
1,500–1,999 12.5 325,197 12.5 184
2,000–2,499 12.9 343,542 13.2 153
2,500–4,999 13.1 825,108 31.7 247
5,000–7,499 14.2 231,129 8.9 39
7,500–19,999 15.6 107,478 4.1 10
20,000–60,000 15.8 177,460 6.8 5
New York City 16.9 371,223 14.3 1
Total 13.86 2,601,184 — 857
Source: Calculated from New York Secretary of State (1846).higher—16.9 per 1,000.3 However, the extent of urbanization in a county,
measured by the share of its population living in places over 5,000, bore no
relationship to the crude death rate in the 812 towns under 5,000 in popu-
lation. There was no spillover of higher urban mortality to the nonurban ar-
eas of a county. However, the crude death rate of a town was positively re-
lated to the death rate in the rest of the county. For the analysis in this
article, practical considerations limited my reﬁnement of the urbanization
eﬀect to the level of the county.
The published results of examinations for military service during the last
half of the war provided estimates of the fraction of draftees, and of recruits
and substitutes rejected for service of those presumably examined medically
(Baxter 1875, vol. 1, pp. 637–767; Fry 1866, 165–213).4 Since recruits and
substitutes sought to join the army, their rejection rate is more likely than
that for draftees to reﬂect actual health status (Smith 2000b).5 These data
are reported for thirty-one registration districts whose boundaries were
those of congressional districts. The rate for each registration district was
assigned to each county it included, with the nine districts in New York
County merged into one. As before, the rate for the regiment is imputed by
the weights derived from the distribution of soldiers among counties re-
ported in the 1865 state census.
As table 4.2 shows, the imputed background urbanization and death
rates for regiments and other units correlate with the deaths from disease
during the Civil War. Regiments whose recruits came from counties that
were more rural and that had lower crude death rates experienced higher
mortality during the war. Regiments whose men were from counties that
were part of congressional districts where fewer recruits and substitutes
failed their medical examinations in the ﬁnal two years of the war also had
higher disease mortality during the war.
The relationship between imputed county-of-origin characteristics to
mortality during the war is not as linear or continuous as the relationship
between town size and the crude death rate in 1845 (table 4.1). Further,
there was substantial variation not accounted for by the diﬀerent classiﬁca-
tions (see the eta-squared statistics in table 4.2). The plan to develop a back-
ground mortality index that would complement the urbanization eﬀect
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3. In his studies, Lee operationalized the eﬀect of prior exposure to disease with a rural-
urban dichotomy, based on having a city over 10,000 in Ohio, or in a metropolitan area in 1860
for troops from the entire North. Six counties—Albany, Erie, Kings, New York, Richmond,
Rensselaer—of the sixty in New York in 1860 were classiﬁed as urban. It is quite plausible that
men who enlisted in the ﬁfty-four nonurban counties had not, on average, been exposed to dis-
ease to the extent of those joining in the six urban counties.
4. These estimates assume that draftees rejected for nonmedical reasons were never med-
ically examined and that recruits and substitutes rejected because they were too old or too
young were also not examined (Smith 2000).
5. In the calculation, those excluded because they were under- or overage were excluded
from the denominator, as it was assumed that they never had a medical examination.Table 4.2 Correlates of Disease Death Indexes for New York Regiments
Classiﬁcation Disease Death Number of
and Category Index Regiments
Inferred crude death rate in 1845 69.4 258
Under 11 per 1,000 94.8 7
12 per 1,000 82.3 52
13 per 1,000 80.9 86
14 per 1,000 55.1 69
15 per 1,000 and higher 51.6 64
 2 and F-value .023 1.50
Inferred crude death rate in 1855 69.4 258
Under 11 per 1,000 105.1 72
12 per 1,000 65.3 43
13 per 1,000 60.2 53
14 per 1,000 46.9 37
15 per 1,000 and higher 49.0 53
 2 and F-value .058 3.90**
Inferred share of population over 5,000 in 1845 69.4 258
Under 20% 98.8 48
20–30% 89.8 72
30–50% 50.3 64
50–70% 47.4 44
70% and higher 46.3 30
 2 and F-value .056 3.74**
Inferred share of population over 2,500 in 1845 69.4 258
Under 60% 105.8 73
60–70% 60.1 74
70–80% 53.5 54
80% and higher 50.1 57
 2 and F-value .058 5.19**
Inferred recruit medical rejection rate, 1863–65 69.4 258
Under 215 per 1,000 examined 106.2 61
215–300 per 1,000 67.9 97
300–350 per 1,000 45.6 35
350 and above per 1,000 49.9 65
 2 and F-value .054 4.81**
Actual region of organization of regiment 69.5 257
New York County 47.8 81
County contiguous to New York County 53.9 30
County on Erie Canal 71.7 60
Elsewhere in state 93.8 86
 2 and F-value .039 3.59*
Sources:New York Secretary of State (1846, 1857); Phisterer (1907, 80–91 and 288–303); Dyer
(1959); Baxter (1875, vol. 2, pp. 637–767).
**Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.failed. Instead, a methodological mountain has yielded something of a sub-
stantive mole hill. Since the background urbanization and mortality in-
dexes were highly correlated (0.7 to 0.9), only one can be employed as a pre-
dictor of the wartime disease mortality index.
4.2 Disease Mortality and Shared versus Distinct 
Disease Environments of Men and Regiments
In addition to throwing men together from diverse disease environments,
soldiering during the Civil War sent men into regions of the country with a
range and variable intensity of disease patterns. The aggregated results tab-
ulated by Phisterer permit some insight into the scope of disease environ-
ments in the Union Army. Usually ten companies, originally composed of
approximately 100 men each, comprised an army infantry regiment. Al-
though companies were sometimes detached from their regiments for spe-
cial service, usually they were not. Companies in regiments in which the
other companies had higher disease death indexes also suﬀered a higher in-
cidence of fatalities from disease. A 1 percent increase in the disease death
index of the men in all other companies in the regiment is associated with
nearly a 1 percent increase in death index for companies in the New York
regiments that experienced a high rate of combat-related deaths (Fox 1974,
183–241).6While common regional origin within New York is also relevant,
the regression equation below also points to an eﬀect from the region of ser-
vice during the war.7
Company Disease Index   7.87   (0.881) 
  (Other Men in Regiment Disease Index)
Oﬃcers who led army companies obviously shared geographic locales
with the men they led. Each company typically had three oﬃcers—a cap-
tain, a ﬁrst lieutenant, and a second lieutenant—and thus each regiment
typically included only thirty line oﬃcers and nine staﬀ oﬃcers (Shannon
1928, vol. 2, 270). As the size of companies and regiments shrank through
attrition, oﬃcers were more likely to be replaced than were men. The best
estimate is that just over 5 percent of men in New York units in the Union
Army were oﬃcers.8 In just over a quarter of the regiments, no oﬃcers died
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6. Included in this analysis are the thirty-nine “ﬁghting regiments” that had more than 130
men killed or died from wounds or, if in a smaller unit, had a high percentage of such combat
deaths.
7. The F-value for the equation is 233.3, with a standard error of the slope of 0.058 and an
adjusted R-squared of 0.346; there were 433 companies in the analysis. This relationship could
be spurious to the extent that the compiler William Fox had more complete coverage of either
the deaths or the numbers enrolled in a unit.
8. In his detailed assessment, Phisterer (1907, 186), estimated that there were 16,000 oﬃcers
and 294,000 enlisted men in New York volunteer units. Oﬃcers thus comprised 5.16 percent
of the total strength, the ﬁgure used in dividing the ﬁgure for the total in the organization.from disease outside of prison, and nearly 80 percent of the regiments had
two or fewer disease deaths among oﬃcers. Given the small numbers in the
base population of oﬃcers, it is not surprising that the correlation of the dis-
ease death index of oﬃcers and men within regiments is weak. On average,
a 1 percent increment in the disease index for enlisted men increased the
oﬃcer index by only a sixth of 1 percent.
Oﬃcer Disease Index   10.35   (0.172)   (Enlisted Men Disease Index)
The F-value is 21.46, the standard error of the slope is 0.037, and the ad-
justed R-squared is 0.083. There were 228 regiments in the analysis.
Any novelty in destination of service could be dangerous, as hinted by the
disease death rates of two exceptional units that stayed home. The 925 men
in the 20th and 28th artillery batteries, organized in late 1862 in New York
City, served throughout the entire course of the war in Fort Schuyler and
Fort Columbus, which guarded New York harbor. Only twelve of these men
died of disease, giving them a death index of 5 per 1,000 man-years, a mere
ﬁfth of the overall average for soldiers from the state.
Most New York regiments served only in the eastern theater of opera-
tions and there mostly in the ninety miles between Richmond, Virginia, and
Washington, D.C. Categorizing the units by a distinctive other region of
service, table 4.3 suggests that being sent to Louisiana or along the Gulf of
Mexico was the most hazardous. The lower Mississippi lived up to its repu-
tation as a deadly region. From July 1861 to June 1865, disease death rates
for Union soldiers in the Department of the Gulf were 26 percent higher
than for the army as a whole (U.S. Surgeon General 1990, vol. 1).9However,
experience in North or South Carolina, which was limited to the coastal
area until the very end of the war, did not yield remarkably higher mortal-
ity indexes.
There was, however, marked variation in the incidence of disease within
regions.10 This variability is to be expected. At some point, as the incidence
of sickness increases, a “tipping point” may be reached after which the
number of cases and fatalities accelerates in a way not predictable by ob-
jective conditions. Such an epidemic occurred in the ﬁve regiments of the
Vermont brigade in the fall of 1861, units whose living and sanitary condi-
tions were, according to investigators, no more miserable than regiments in
which the incidence of sickness was quite low (Benedict 1886, 237–40).
Even without such an accelerant, clustering of deaths within particular
companies and regiments is to be expected. These units encountered par-
ticular circumstances or their members had special characteristics that are
not known or knowable to an investigator nearly a century and a half later.
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9. Deaths occurring in general hospitals are excluded in this comparison.
10. Many of the regiments that had some experience outside of the eastern theater also spent
time within that area. Employing analysis of variance for both four- and ﬁve-category regional
classiﬁcations shows that the diﬀerence between regions was signiﬁcant only at the 0.1 level.Oﬃcers and men in the same regiment may have advanced (or failed to
advance) through the South together, but they did not share entirely the
smaller disease milieu of the camp. Phisterer’s tabulations are especially
valuable here in suggesting the boundaries of disease environments. Over-
all, enlisted men were three times as likely to die from disease as were oﬃc-
ers (see table 4.3). While the Center for Population Economics (CPE)
sample is restricted to enlisted men, limited evidence indicates that oﬃcers
were taller, more likely to be native-born, and more frequently drawn from
the ranks of the middle class than were enlisted men. As noted, these at-
tributes are not associated with a lower death rate from disease. Whether
oﬃcers were more likely to come from cities and larger towns than enlisted
men is uncertain.
Oﬃcers and enlisted men did not live in immediate proximity. According
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Table 4.3 Disease Death Indexes for New York Regiments and Other Units by
Rank, Cause, and Distinctive Region of Service, for Prisoners
and Nonprisoners
Disease Death Indexes
N
Region of Service of Per 1,000 Per 1,000
Regiment or Other Unit Man-Years Men Men Units
Totals for region of service 24.7 64.0 303,662 249
Only in eastern theater 22.1 54.0 204,239 164
Only in New York 5.0 13.0 925 2
Ever in Louisiana or Gulf region 41.8 110.5 30,229 28
Ever in the Carolinas 24.2 71.3 48,924 38
Ever in western theater 27.0 77.4 20,270 19
With Sherman to the sea 32.7 90.7 13,220 12
Not with Sherman 16.2 52.3 7,050 7
By military rank 63.2 317,340 264
Enlisted men 65.4 288,719 264
Oﬃcers 23.0 15,713 264
After being wounded 123.2 55,442 267
Enlisted men 122.2 52,245 267
Oﬃcers 136.1 3,197 267
Prisoners of war (disease) 153.0 31,066 267
Enlisted men 156.6 30,112 267
Oﬃcers 39.8 954 267
Prisoners of war (wounds and other) 32.3 31,066 267
Enlisted men 32.7 954 267
Oﬃcers 19.9 30,112 267
Notes: The denominator of the index based on man-years is the “number of men in organiza-
tion among whom losses occurred” multiplied by the diﬀerence between date the regiment or
other unit was mustered in and the date it was mustered out. Ideally, the denominator should
be the average number of men in the unit over the duration of its service.
Sources: Phisterer (1907, 80–91 and 288–303); Dyer (1959).to regulations, privates in an army camp were grouped by company with a
street in between. At one end, perpendicular to the street of enlisted men,
were rows: ﬁrst, noncommissioned oﬃcers, then the commissioned oﬃcers
of the companies, and ﬁnally the staﬀand commander of the regiment, who
were located in front of the baggage train. Behind the baggage train were the
latrines for the oﬃcers, while the soldiers relieved themselves in latrines at
the opposite end of the camp (Wiley 1952, pp. 55 and 373n. 45). Oﬃcers
and men also ate at separate messes, and oﬃcers used their own funds to
purchase food. The leaders and the led shared geographically deﬁned dis-
ease environments (e.g., malarial regions) but not what might be called the
micro-microbe-disease space.
The fourfold ratio of the mortality indexes between oﬃcers and enlisted
men incarcerated in POW camps also illustrates the importance of the en-
vironment in which those in the Union Army served. With rare exceptions,
Union oﬃcers were imprisoned in camps apart from captured enlisted men
(Marvel 1994, 293). Imprisoned oﬃcers died more frequently than those
who were never captured (and at much higher rate if duration of exposure
could be calculated), but conditions for captured oﬃcers sometimes were
not harsh (Mitchell 1988, 221n. 64). Nearly one in six captured New York
enlisted men died in Confederate prisons compared to one in twenty-ﬁve
oﬃcers.
A common circumstance—being wounded in action—yielded quite sim-
ilar mortality outcomes for oﬃcers and enlisted men. Indeed, a slightly
higher percentage of wounded oﬃcers died (13.6 percent) than wounded
men (12.2 percent). Possible explanations of this similarity are that the dis-
tribution of severity of the wounds was not radically diﬀerent for men and
oﬃcers and that postwound infections were a great leveler. All else equal,
oﬃcers should have had a lower wound case fatality rate. Because they were
salaried and paid for their food, wounded oﬃcers were not hospitalized
with enlisted men. If the wounds were minor, they were cared for in their
own quarters by an orderly. Other options for wounded oﬃcers included
care in a private hospital or sick-leave at home (Adams 1952, 171–72). The
smaller disparity between the mortality indexes among oﬃcer and enlisted
POWs due to wounds and other causes (19.5 and 32.7 per 1,000) compared
to disease (39.8 and 156.6) leads to the speculation that oﬃcers were, on av-
erage, more severely wounded than men.
4.3 Measuring Length of Observation and Deaths of Individual
Enlisted Men in New York Sampled Companies
Key to demographic analysis is the concept of population at risk. The
rich detail in the sample of Union Army enlisted men can be exploited to
capture when men ﬁrst came under observation and when they no longer
were. To do so required a variety of assumptions. In the version of the CPE
98 Daniel Scott Smithdata set used in this paper, there were 7,617 enlisted men in companies or-
ganized by New York state. For 208 (2.73 percent), there were no dates ex-
cept those for enlistment recorded on the descriptive roll of the company,
the original source of the data. With the assumption that no military service
record could be located, these men were dropped from the analysis; the im-
plicit assumption here is that their mortality experience in the army was
identical to those whose entry and exit dates could be determined.
Accepting the enlistment date provided in the descriptive rolls as the ap-
propriate date of entry into observation was the most critical assumption.
Other sources, presumably the military service records, provided up to three
separate enlistment dates. Of these, some 7.5 percent came six or more
months before the enlistment date on the descriptive roll and 5.4 percent
came a year or more earlier. In all, 13.6 percent had earlier dates of enlist-
ment, but very short intervals can be attributed to slight variants in record-
ing the same date or as the result of men who served previously for three
months under Lincoln’s original call of 15 April 1861 for 75,000 men. New
York provided 13,906 men in this instance. The longer intervals may be at-
tributed to those enlisting in a sampled company after serving two years un-
der the second call of 1861 in another company or regiment. New York pro-
vided the only troops (30,950) enlisting for two years under this call
(Phisterer 1907, 3–4). Whatever the reason for the discrepancy between the
enlistment date recorded on the descriptive roll and the enlistment dates ap-
pearing on other records, the former must be correct from a demographic
perspective. The soldier is not at risk to die before joining one of the com-
panies that were sampled at the beginning of the project. However, for 2.7
percent of the cases missing information on the date of enlistment in the de-
scriptive roll, an enlistment date from other records was taken as the date of
entry into observation.
Some ambiguity exists with respect to the date the soldier was last under
observation during the war. On the assumption that the date of death was
an important and deﬁnitive event, and given that there are no variant
records of this date, it was accepted as correct. Of those who died of disease
before 1866, 6.9 percent had some other occurrence in their lives recorded
as taking place after they had died. For 3.5 percent of these deaths this un-
natural event occurred more than three months after they had died. Since
the timing of this postmortem event was found by computing the maximum
date among all of the many events recorded by date in the data—discharge,
military court action, release from hospital, etc.—the procedure is sensitive
to errors in the original records or in the data entry.
If no death during the war era was recorded, the men were regarded as
being under continuous observation in the ﬁrst period until the date of the
latest event recorded unless there was a deﬁnitive break of more than 0.25
years between a seeming date of departure and a subsequent date of reen-
try. The working assumption here was that a soldier was really under con-
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the period at risk tends to minimize the measured mortality rate. For ex-
ample, someone who deserted but later returned was treated as never hav-
ing left. It would be possible to make better judgments, on a case-by-case
basis, as to whether someone was really under observation at every point.
Using assumptions that maximized the apparent length of the ﬁrst period
that the soldier was under continuous scrutiny, the goal was to minimize the
complexity of the data set. Only if there was a gap of more than 0.25 years
between a date of discharge and a date of reenlistment was the ﬁrst period
terminated by the discharge date. In this chapter, the relatively few second
and ever-fewer subsequent observation spells that began with reenlistments
were excluded from the analysis.
Limiting this study to soldiers from one state, even one as large as New
York, sharply reduces the number of events to be analyzed. To maximize
that number, 619 deaths from all speciﬁed noncombat causes are included.
While death from disease was around four times higher than that experi-
enced by young adult men in civilian life in the mid-nineteenth century, only
8.3 percent of sampled soldiers died from these causes. Almost half of the
deaths were due to two causes: diarrhea (27.5 percent) and typhoid (22.3
percent). Other relatively numerous killers were fevers of various types (6.8
percent), dysentery (4.5 percent), tuberculosis (3.7 percent), pneumonia
(3.2 percent), scurvy (2.6 percent), and starvation (2.6 percent). A handful
of deaths probably incident to wounds (gangrene, erysipelas, and possibly
some of the unspeciﬁed diseases) are included.
4.4 Seasoning and the Eﬀect of Duration of Service
Seasoning—the elevation of disease and death from disease that oc-
curred as a consequence of movement—is a pervasive phenomenon in the
literature of historical demography. Whether moving to cities in the early
modern era, to the Chesapeake region from Great Britain in the seven-
teenth century, or into the Union Army from rural Ohio, arrivals did poorly
during their initial exposure to the new disease environment. As table 4.4
demonstrates for enlisted infantrymen in units organized in New York
state, death from disease declined with the length of time served (Lee 1997,
42). The overall death rate from disease was 46.0 per 1,000 man-years. In
the ﬁrst year of observation the rate was 55.6 compared to 41.8 for the sec-
ond year. For those under observation longer than two years, the rate was
34.8 per 1,000 from then until the end of military service.
As was the case for Ohio troops studied by Lee, the chances of death from
disease peaked well into the ﬁrst year of service. In New York, the death rate
for the ﬁrst six months was lower (45.2 per 1,000 man-years) than in the sec-
ond six months (69.2). Given the predominance of infectious diseases, this
delay in the seasoning peak is surprising. Only 11 percent of those whom
100 Daniel Scott Smiththe 1850 census (DeBow 1855, 23) reported dying from such diseases, clas-
siﬁed then as zymotic, were sick longer than a month. The apparent delay
in seasoning is consistent with the substantial increase in disease mortality
in the Union Army during the ﬁrst year and a half of the war (Elliott 1862;
Olmstead 1866). Death rates from disease more than doubled between the
third quarter of 1861 and the ﬁrst quarter of 1862 and then rose by an ad-
ditional 30 percent by the ﬁnal quarter of 1862 (U.S. Surgeon General 1990,
vol. 1).
Data collected in an innovative quantitative investigation of camp condi-
tions are suggestive about the delay in peak seasoning mortality until the
second half of the year of ﬁrst service. Investigators from the U.S. Sanitary
Commission, a nongovernmental organization, evaluated various aspects
of the camps that they considered relevant to the incidence of sickness. The
agency then coded the responses to questions about camp sites, tents, clean-
liness, rations, discipline, water supply, medical services, etc., for 450 units
that were surveyed between August and early December 1861. Conditions
were ranked from 1 (“extremely bad”) through 5 (“indiﬀerent”) to 10 (“per-
fect”); scores above 7 (“very good”) were rarely awarded. In December
1861, Frederick Law Olmstead (1866, 34), the commission’s executive di-
rector, reported on a tabulation of these scores for 200 regiments surveyed
prior to 1 November 1861 and gave his impressions of the army’s medical
problems. Olmstead and his fellow commission directors, however, relied
on prior beliefs and tabulations of each variable separately to support pol-
icy recommendations made in a letter to President Abraham Lincoln on 21
July 1861. They charged that “the careless and superﬁcial medical inspec-
tion of recruits made at least 25 per cent of the volunteer army raised last
year not only utterly useless, but a positive incumbrance and embarrass-
New York Union Army Regiments and Soldiers 101
Table 4.4 Death Rates by Duration of Exposure, New York Union Army
Enlisted Men
Death Rate Number Man-Years Starting
Period of Exposure per 1,000 of Deaths at Risk Cohort Size
Enlistment until exit 46.0 613 13,325 7,548
Enlistment to end year 1 55.6 330 5,928 7,548
Start year 2 to end year 2 41.8 147 3,514 4,338
Start year 3 until exit 34.8 136 3,883 2,721
First six months 45.2 151 3,343
Second six months 69.2 179 2,585
Third six months 47.7 94 1,968
Fourth six months 34.2 53 1,545
Fifth six months 50.3 62 1,232
After 2.5 years to exit 27.9 74 2,652 2,283
Source: Fogel (2000).ment, ﬁlling our hospitals with invalids” (U.S. War Department 1899, 235).
Using the microﬁlm edition of the original returns (Scholarly Resources
1999, microﬁlm roll 27, frames 268–1197, and roll 28, frames 8–28), condi-
tions relevant to disease can be related to the rate of sickness a regiment ex-
perienced during a month.
Over a quarter of the 450 regiments whose conditions were quantiﬁed af-
ter being surveyed by the Sanitary Commission inspectors were from New
York. On average, nearly four months (119 days) had passed between mus-
tering in and inspection. The inﬂuences on sickness early in the war were
not those that can be related to mortality from disease during the ﬁrst year
of service. Neither the overall sickness rate (57 per 1,000) nor its compo-
nents—sick in quarters, in the regimental hospital, or in the general hospi-
tal—bore any relationship to the extent of urbanization or the crude death
rates of the counties where the units had been recruited. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, none of the conditions in the camps had an impact on the rate of sick-
ness.11The only indicator that predicted signiﬁcantly more sickness was the
report that the initial medical examination had been inadequate. On aver-
age, the sickness rate in the twenty-seven regiments that had a thorough ex-
amination upon entering the army was only 33.0 per 1,000 strong compared
to the overall rate of 56.6, a ﬁnding that supported one of the main pre-
scriptions of the Sanitary Commission for reform.
There is suggestive evidence that the theory of the Sanitary Commission
as to what mattered shaped how their investigators assessed the evidence.
That is, the retrospective conclusion about the thoroughness of the initial
medical inspection, presumably learned in conversation with the regimen-
tal surgeons (whose training was almost always favorably evaluated by the
man from the Sanitary Commission), was not independent of knowledge of
the monthly sickness rate.
In a regiment with a lot of sickness, what or who was to be blamed?
Thirty-ﬁve of the 117 New York regiments were inspected on more than one
occasion during the ﬁve-month period. The investigators reported the same
evaluation of the initial medical examination for only twenty-two of the reg-
iments. In thirteen cases, the inspectors diﬀered on whether the examina-
tion upon entering the army had been adequate. For eight regiments, the
scoring of the initial medical examination as inadequate was associated
with a much higher rate of sickness (36 per 1,000 on average) than that ex-
perienced during the month that the inspector reported a thorough initial
exam. For the ﬁve remaining anomalous regiments, a more favorable as-
sessment of the initial examination with a smaller increase in the sickness
rate (5 per 1,000).
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11. This was not true in the data that included all of the inspections. Regiments from regions
(the Midwest and northern New England) that had greater disease mortality during the war
also experienced a higher incidence of early sickness.The risk of death from disease continued to decrease after the ﬁrst year
of service. Possibly due to the small sample of deaths in later six-month in-
tervals, the decrease was not monotonic. Lee also found a second peak to-
ward the end of the second year of service in his analysis of Ohio troops.
The seasoning eﬀect is intertwined with the destination of service. If most
of the service in a region were concentrated into the ﬁrst segment of a com-
pany’s tour of duty, then the apparent eﬀect of serving in that region would
be exaggerated. Table 4.5 divides the sample into the ﬁrst and all other sub-
sequent geographic locations of service. The results concur with the ﬁnding
in the regimental-level data (table 4.3) that service in Louisiana and the
Gulf region was most hazardous to life. However, these data, tabulated
throughout by the region of ﬁrst service, suggest that the apparent higher
mortality in Louisiana and the Gulf is elevated because of the high rate of
New York men sent there at the beginning of their time in the army. Initial
service in the Carolinas was not less deadly than soldiering elsewhere.12
Many factors contributed to the incidence of death from disease among
New York enlisted infantrymen. For each of these variables, column (2) of
table 4.6 reports the index per 1,000 men of dying from disease while they
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Table 4.5 Death Rates by Geographic Location of Service
Death Rate Number Man-Years
Region of Service per 1,000 of Deaths at Risk
First service region total 50.0 458 9,152
Eastern theater 49.8 365 7,325
Louisiana and Gulf 71.2 61 856
Carolinas 26.6 24 903
Western theater 119.4 8 67
For second geographic region of service
First service region total 36.8 154 4,186
Eastern theater 32.2 95 2,947
Louisiana and Gulf 43.6 21 481
Carolinas 45.2 28 620
Western theater 71.9 10 139
For both ﬁrst and second geographic regions
First service region total 45.9 612 13,338
Eastern theater 44.8 460 10,272
Louisiana and Gulf 65.9 82 1,337
Carolinas 34.1 52 1,523
Western theater 87.4 18 206
Sources: Fogel (2000); Dyer (1959).
12. Figures tabulated at the conclusion of the war indicate that Union soldiers in coastal
South Carolina—the Department of the South—experienced higher disease mortality than
the rest of the army in the ﬁrst and last years of the war but lower mortality in the middle half
(U.S. Surgeon General 1990, vol. 1).T
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.were in the Union Army. (The percentage of men in each category appears
in column [1]). Overall, 8.36 percent of those who enlisted died from disease
while they were in the army.
Three variables—year of enlistment, term of service, and birth cohort—
should be regarded as controls. These indicators have statistical but not
substantive relevance. The ﬁrst two aﬀect the proportion every dying of dis-
ease by altering the potential period at risk. It is not surprising, for example,
that only 2.3 percent enlisting in 1865 died of disease while in the army. Age,
of course, bears a substantive relationship to the risk of death, but this re-
lationship is so well known that it lacks interest here. That only the oldest
age group—those born before 1830—had a higher fraction die of disease
may be attributed mostly to the fact that men born before 1830 were much
older than the birth cohort of the 1830s. They were 38.6 years old at the time
of enlistment compared to 26.6 for those born in the 1830s and 19.8 for
those born in 1840 or after. Depending on location or status, infantrymen
diﬀered in average age. For example, natives were three years younger than
the foreign-born, those enlisting in New York City were 1.1 years older and
farmers were 1.3 years younger than the overall average. Such diﬀerences in
age distribution potentially can obscure or distort the relationships that are
of more genuine interpretive interest. Hence age is included as a separate
variable in the analysis.
Three of the indicators reﬂect diﬀerent wartime circumstances. Not sur-
prisingly, ever being a prisoner of war of the Confederates was particularly
deadly. No less than one-third of captured New York infantrymen in the
CPE sample died of disease. In addition, ﬁrst serving beyond the Atlantic
coast—either in the western theater or in the Louisiana–Gulf of Mexico re-
gion—elevated the disease death index.
Of particular interest are those attributes characterizing the soldiers at or
before the time of enlistment in one of the sampled companies. Those who
had not previously served in the army (8.6 percent), farmers (12.0 percent),
the native-born (10.3 percent), those who enlisted in upstate New York out-
side of the areas of New York City and the Erie Canal (10.8 percent), and
those who were of more than 69 inches in height (10.4 percent) were more
likely to die from disease in the army.
Additionally, men who enlisted in counties that had lower rates of med-
ical rejections for service of recruits and substitutes in the last two years of
the war (r   –0.07), that were less urban in 1845 (r   –0.07), and that had
lower crude death rates in 1855 (r   –0.08) were also modestly (but statisti-
cally signiﬁcantly) more likely to die from disease in the Union Army. As
was shown by Lee (1997, and ch. 3 in the present volume), seemingly health-
ier men from apparently healthier environments were particularly likely to
succumb to disease during the war.
To deal with the inﬂuence of a range of interrelated variables requires, of
course, a multivariate approach. Taking a relatively simple approach to
106 Daniel Scott Smithcomplexity, table 4.6 uses logistic regression analysis to estimate the odds of
death from disease over the entire period the soldier was in observation
(column [3]).13 Since the categorical and interval-level aggregate variables
statistically overlap, the latter are omitted from table 4.6. Not unexpectedly,
the statistical signiﬁcance of some of the remaining variables wanes in this
assessment, including height and the variable detailing the geographic re-
gion of enlistment within the state. Everything considered, farmers were
more likely—and those born in Canada and Germany among the foreign-
born were less likely—to die from disease. Interpretation should follow the
Seussian objection to identifying speciﬁc importance of any variable with
how many “stars upon thars,” i.e., ∗∗∗ attached to standard errors to indi-
cate the extent of statistical signiﬁcance.14 The level of statistical signiﬁ-
cance depends on how validly each variable was deﬁned and how reliably
each was measured, and on the number of covarying indicators included in
the analysis. Recall that table 4.1 suggested that a continuous relationship
existed between the size of a town and the crude death rate. The county of
enlistment is, of course, larger than the town of enlistment. Further, soldiers
tended to enlist in central places—towns and cities that were larger than the
places where they actually lived. Given the rates of geographic mobility in
nineteenth-century America, an enlistee’s town of residence could often
diﬀer from the place he spent his childhood and youth. A safe conclusion is
that, all else considered, prior exposure to disease did increase one’s risk of
death from disease while serving in the Union Army, rather than that it was
a farm background that reallymattered (also see Lee’s ch. 3 in this volume).
To isolate the impact of seasoning, separate logistic regression analyses
were undertaken of disease mortality during the ﬁrst year (column [4] of
table 4.6) and the interval following the conclusion of the initial year of ser-
vice (column [5]). The logic here is that the background factors associated
with prior exposure to disease should be much stronger in the ﬁrst year than
thereafter. That logic of the source of seasoning mortality is conﬁrmed,
most suggestively by the importance of region of enlistment during the ﬁrst
year of service and the nearly complete absence of its impact thereafter.
Similarly, variation in the risk of death wanes after the ﬁrst year of service
among soldiers whose prewar occupations diﬀered.15 Two of the factors re-
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13. Again, this index diﬀers from a true cohort death probability since it does not account
for varying lengths of time that the soldier was in the army before exiting via death from com-
bat, desertion, discharge, etc.
14. As told by Dr. Seuss (Geisel 1961, 3–4), the Plain Belly Sneeches had “none upon thars”:
“But, because they had stars, all the Star-Belly Sneetches / Would brag, We’re the best kind of
Sneetch on the beaches.”
15. It should be noted that the shrinkage of the sample contributes the decline in the indi-
cators of statistical signiﬁcance. In the ﬁrst year, some 302 disease deaths occurred to an orig-
inal 6,786 enlistments. After the ﬁrst year, there were only 265 deaths caused by disease among
the 3,887 soldiers who were still in the army at the beginning of the second year of service.
Thus, some of the odds ratios diverge after the ﬁrst year, even though they are less likely to pass
a test of statistical signiﬁcance.lated to wartime experience—being a prisoner of war, and the region of ﬁrst
service—increase in importance after the ﬁrst year. During the ﬁrst two
years of the Civil War, prisoners were generally exchanged or paroled after
relatively brief incarceration. Later in the conﬂict, prisoner exchanges be-
tween the Union and Confederate forces broke down.
Even after taking into account both background and wartime factors, an
indicator that relates to the sharing of more particular mortality environ-
ments or the process of contagion also must be incorporated into the anal-
ysis. This indicator—the percentage of other men who died from disease in
a sampled company—represents an attempt to operationalize the concen-
tration of mortality experience associated with soldiering together than
cannot be attributed to the areas of origin within New York state or to
broad geographic regions of service while in the army.16 In order to isolate
this factor, which taps otherwise unmeasured aggregate inﬂuences on mor-
tality, on seasoning, the analysis in table 4.7 divides company-mortality in-
cidence into periods during (column [2]), and after (column [3]) the ﬁrst
year of service as well as overall (column [2]).
Overall, its inclusion resulted in a 9.3 percent improvement of the model.
An absolute increment of 10 percent in the disease death index of the other
men in a company increased the death index for the individual soldier by 5.4
percent. Its eﬀect on the other variables shows up markedly in the attenua-
tion of the impact of location of ﬁrst service. This outcome is not surpris-
ing, since both service location and the intracompany concentration of
death are indicators measured at the aggregate level. However, it had almost
no impact on the other company-level indicator—where the unit was or-
ganized within New York state. Eﬀects on individual-level characteristics
such as nativity and occupation are barely noticeable. This bunching of
death within companies in a regiment is an independent dimension of the
structuring of disease mortality.17
This paper has demonstrated that a multiplicity of factors must be con-
sidered to understand variation in death from disease of soldiers from New
York during the Civil War. Background factors such as occupation and type
of residence, sensibly viewed as related to the extent of prior exposure to
disease, mattered. Once in the army, the risk of death varied depending on
how long the soldier had served and whether he had prior military service.
The background factors mattered to any great extent only during the initial
year of experience in the military. After a year of service, seasoning having
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16. For example, consider a company with 100 infantrymen that experienced eight deaths
from disease. In this case, the clustering index for a soldier who died of wartime disease was
7/99 and 8/99 for a man who did not. If two or more companies from the same regiment were
included in the CPE sample, the base of the index is the entire number sampled from the regi-
ment.
17. Without the addition of other variables, the ordinary least squares estimate is that an in-
crease of 10.0 per 1,000 in the death index of other men in a company would increase the indi-
vidual index by 5.6 per 1,000.Table 4.7 Logistic Regression of Longitudinal Disease Mortality Index by Timing of Death
with Company-Disease Mortality Included
Entire-Sample Death-in-First-Year Death-after-First-Year
Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
Variable and Category (1) (2) (3)
Height Group (n.s.) Group (n.s.) Group (n.s.)
Under 65  1.02 0.99 1.03
65–66  0.76* 0.70* 0.85
67–68  Ref. Ref. Ref.
69  or taller 1.04 1.00 1.12
Inferred previous enlistment 
(before date in descriptive roll) Group** Group* Group (n.s.)
No discrepancy Ref. Ref. Ref.
Gap under one year 1.01 1.04 0.96
Gap greater than one year 0.28** 0.33** 0.13*
Region of county of enlistment Group (n.s.) Group* Group (n.s.)
New York County 0.86 0.58** 1.00
Contiguous to New York 0.83 0.60* 0.98
On Erie Canal 0.88 0.76 0.90
Elsewhere in state Ref. Ref. Ref.
Occupational group Group* Group* Group (n.s.)
Professionals and proprietors 0.79 0.55 1.11
Unclassiﬁed and missing 0.94 0.71 1.24
Farmers 1.37** 1.34* 1.26
Workers Ref. Ref. Ref.
Country of birth Group** Group (n.s.) Group (n.s.)
United States Ref. Ref. Ref.
Canada 0.62* 0.72 0.54
England 0.87 0.83 0.93
Ireland 0.74* 0.64* 0.74
Germany 0.62* 0.71 0.63
Other foreign country 0.68 0.64 0.69
Year of enlistment Group* Group*** Group (n.s.)
1861 1.03 0.59* 1.36
1862 0.94 0.62* 1.22
1863 Ref. Ref. Ref.
1864 1.04 1.38 0.75
1865 0.47* 0.74 0.04
Birth cohort Group**** Group**** Group****
Before 1830 1.95**** 1.82*** 2.36****
1830–39 0.96 0.89 1.10
1840 and after Ref. Ref. Ref.
Location of ﬁrst distant service Group (n.s.) Group (n.s.) Group (n.s.)
Eastern theater Ref. Ref. Ref.
Louisiana or Gulf 1.35* 1.23 1.55*
Carolinas 1.06 0.58 1.33
Western theater 1.10 0.76 0.93
Ever a prisoner of war? Group**** Group** Group****
Yes 5.52**** 2.11** 7.98****
No Ref. Ref. Ref.
(continued)been accomplished, soldiers recruited from upstate New York died from
disease at a rate identical to that of soldiers enlisted in New York County,
in contiguous counties, or counties the Erie Canal traversed. Experience in
the army also helped to determine disease mortality. If the soldier found
himself in a more dangerous disease environment—along the lower Missis-
sippi or the Gulf of Mexico, or, most drastically, in a POW camp—he was
more likely to die from disease. Finally, the soldier shared mortality risks
with those men with whom he was in close contact—the other enlisted men
in his company and regiment. With the troops, but not intermingled with
them and the microorganisms they embodied, oﬃcers were much less likely
to succumb to disease.
Why did so many Union Army soldiers die of disease during the Civil
War? Perhaps because the sources of mortality were so diverse.
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